“This is a society, a world, a planet dying because there is not enough consciousness, because there is not enough awareness, enough coordination of intent-to-problem. And yet, we spend vast amounts of money stigmatizing people and substances that are part of this effort to expand consciousness, see things in different ways, unleash creativity. Isn’t it perfectly clear that business as usual is a bullet through the head?”
we can create mechanisms whereby people will respond emotionally . . . edward bernays 'propaganda'
in wartime the state has the power to accrue to itself all kinds of prerogatives it wouldn't afford to itself during peacetime
american values = corporate instilled values
the perpetuation of the psychosis of permanent war
liberalism was designed to be the safety valve
the founding fathers
african american experience
the myth of the founding fathers
which even the left in this country continues to deify
these were white, slaveholding, male oligarchs
& the last thing they wanted
(& it's all in 'the federalist papers')
the last thing they wanted
was a popular democracy
& so they created innumerable mechanisms to make sure it wouldn't happen
& that was not only the disenfranchisement of african americans
of native americans
but also, men without property
it was about creating a senate where senators were appointed
it was about creating an electoral college
increasing number of women who want to be treated like humans
(Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the perceived redness of an evening sky.
Daniel Dennett (b. 1942), American philosopher and cognitive scientist, writes that qualia is "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us."
Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961), the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take:
The sensation of color cannot be accounted for by the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the physiologist account for it, if he had fuller knowledge than he has of the processes in the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so.
The importance of qualia as a concept in the philosophy of mind comes largely from the fact that it is seen as posing a fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body problem. Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. As such, the nature and existence of qualia are controversial.
four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia. According to these, qualia are:
- ineffable; that is, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any other means than direct experience.
- intrinsic; that is, they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.
- private; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.
- directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; that is, to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale.
If qualia of this sort exist, then a normally sighted person who sees red would be unable to describe the experience of this perception in such a way that a listener who has never experienced color will be able to know everything there is to know about that experience. Though it is possible to make an analogy, such as "red looks hot", or to provide a description of the conditions under which the experience occurs, such as "it's the color you see when light of 700-nm wavelength is directed at you", supporters of this kind of qualia contend that such a description is incapable of providing a complete description of the experience.
Another way of defining qualia is as "raw feels". A raw feel is a perception in and of itself, considered entirely in isolation from any effect it might have on behavior and behavioral disposition. In contrast, a cooked feel is that perception seen as existing in terms of its effects. For example, the perception of the taste of wine is an ineffable, raw feel, while the experience of warmth or bitterness caused by that taste of wine would be a cooked feel. A cooked feel is not qualia.
According to an argument put forth by Saul Kripke in his paper "Identity and Necessity" (1971), one key consequence of the claim that such things as raw feels can be meaningfully discussed—that qualia exist—is that it leads to the logical possibility of two entities exhibiting identical behavior in all ways despite one of them entirely lacking qualia. While very few ever claim that such an entity, called a philosophical zombie, actually exists, the mere possibility is claimed to be sufficient to refute physicalism.
See also: Hard problem of consciousness)